The "25% rule"

The "25% rule" is that if you destroy one quarter of an organization, the
rest of the organization breaks down. This is a relationship derived by
systems analysis using a mathematical model of military and civilian
organizations. It is based on the concept that information has to flow
within an organization for it to function effectively. If the organization
is to work that flow must be maintained, including orders for action and for
supplies as well as feedback regarding the success of actions or programs.
It makes sense that if a certain proportion of an organization no longer
functions, or in war is destroyed, at some point it will not be able to
function effectively. A good analogy is that if you remove enough bricks
from a wall it will eventually collapse, at what point it collapses depends
on how many bricks are removed and where they are located.
Since WWII numerous analyses found that the magic break-off point is 25%.
In other words if 25% of an organization is non-functional, the whole
organization ceases to operate effectively. This is obviously a very
important piece of knowledge to have about an enemy in a war situation.
But, the latest application that I recently read about is to anti-Israel
terrorism, in an article by Isaac Ben-Israel, former Head of Research &
Development at the Ministry of Defense, and presented at a conference in
Russia,
It has been said that it is impossible to fight terrorism because every time
one terrorist is killed another pops up to take his place. But, the same
argument applies to regular military organizations, where officers have a
designated replacement at every level, yet armies are defeated all the time.
You might say that terrorist organizations are informal or cell-like so the
normal rules of organizations don't apply to them, but that isn't true
either, because they are similar in that plans and orders go down the chain
of command and responses go back up. They have to obtain supplies, of
explosives, and prepare them as belts and supply guns and ammunition, etc.
At any one time at least 100 people will be needed to maintain an
efficiently running terrorist organization, and in fact many more if they
are competing for men and scarce resources.
Mr. Ben-Israel (which may be a pseudonym) presented data about the Israeli
experience with Palestinian terrorism. At first it was assumed that Pres.
Arafat was actually directing the terrorist program, but then it was found
that he simply facilitated it with funds and support, but did not play a
direct role in their operations. Each terrorist organization has its own
chain of command, and selects its own targets independently. But, the
choice is determined by the upper echelon and orders are send down to find
an appropriate bomber and prepare the bomb belt for him or her, etc. After
the intifada started, the IDF used to respond specifically to each major
bomb attack, but the continuing number of attacks were not affected.
So then in 2002 the IDF switched tactics and started to attack the upper
echelons of the organizations independently of the timing of the suicide
bombings. When they had captured (in the West Bank) or killed (in Gaza) ca.
25% of the estimated size of the organization a significant reduction in the
number of bombings was noted (graphs are available to show this). Once the
number of members have been reduced to this extent the organization as a
whole is no longer able to function effectively, and although infiltration
attempts are still being made, the organization has been rendered
ineffectual.
Of course, organizations can reorganize, find new people etc. But, the
removal of the major heads of the terrorist organizations (Sheikh Yassin,
Rantisi, etc.) and most of the senior officers have brought the number of
suicide bombings down to a minimal level independently of the security fence
and the other military actions of the IDF. But, its not only the heads, but
the total proportion of the organization that has been destroyed - 25%!
I can send a copy of the original article (with graphs and mathematical
analysis) to any one who requests it. Thanks to Barry Shaw for drawing this
article to my attention.