Integrity
Major Gen. Udi Adam, Head of Northern Command of the IDF during the recent war in Lebanon, has resigned. He presented his letter of resignation to the Chief of Staff Dan Halutz yesterday and to Defense Minister Peretz today. In resigning Gen. Adam did not take personal responsibility for all the many failures of the war, but did so as a matter of personal integrity. Apparently during the war he had a serious falling out with Dan Halutz, which caused Halutz to appoint his Deputy Maj. Gen. Kaplinsky as his representative to the Northern command as a means of out-flanking Adam. Adam comes from a well-known military family, his father was a famous general who carried out numerous dangerous actions in the Yom Kippur war in Sinai and was the highest IDF rank killed in action. Adam has stated that he hopes his action will cause other high officers to follow his example. By this he clearly means Halutz and Peretz.
There were two kinds of failures that took place during the war, and even though there were many and they were significant, overall the war was still a success relative to the predicament of Hizbollah. The two kinds of failures were strategic and tactical. The strategic failures were largely commited by the highest echelon of Government and IDF involving war strategy, such as whether or not to depend largely or entirely on IAF power, and if or when to engage the IDF armored corps and infantry in a ground invasion of S. Lebanon. It does not take too much imagination to conclude that the crux of the disagreement between Adam and Halutz was over this issue, since Halutz was former head of the air force and Adam was head of the tanks corps. Most observers agree that Halutz relied too much on air power and should have involved the ground forces earlier and at larger strength than was eventually used, but others disagree. There was no doubt a great deal of indecision at the command level, with IDF forces being ordered into battle, and then the orders being either cancelled or changed. This has been interpreted as the higher echelon rescinding orders that might have resulted in casualties that would have been their responsibility. As a result the war was fought in an indecisive and incoherent manner.
The tactical failures were such as not supplying food and water to the troops on the ground, not taking enough precautions to protect troops in bivouac areas from incoming rockets, incorrect armaments, not enough intelligence of fortified Hizbollah positions, not enough coordination between helicopters and ground forces, etc. Other failures, included the lack of a defence against short range Katyusha rockets (Nautilus) and no active defence of tanks (17 were hit and several IDF servicemen were killed), even though systems to do this were recently cancelled by the Defense Ministry.
There are now several Committees set up by the Olmert Government to look into these failures and report. No doubt some heads will roll, but Adam will probably not be one of them. He took the dignified way out.
It should be pointed out that after most wars, both sides lick their wounds and try to find out what happened. The sense of failure, of not having done as well as one could have done, is probably inevitable. But, while Israel is facing its failures, it is sinking in in Lebanon and the Arab world that Hizbollah took a drubbing. They have been forced to agree to things that were inconceivable before the war, such as the deployment of the Lebanese Army and international forces (UNIFIL2) in the south and in view of the huge extent of the destruction in the Shia areas, they will not any time soon risk losing their support in Lebanon and among the Shia by provoking Israel or jeopardizing the ceasefire.
There were two kinds of failures that took place during the war, and even though there were many and they were significant, overall the war was still a success relative to the predicament of Hizbollah. The two kinds of failures were strategic and tactical. The strategic failures were largely commited by the highest echelon of Government and IDF involving war strategy, such as whether or not to depend largely or entirely on IAF power, and if or when to engage the IDF armored corps and infantry in a ground invasion of S. Lebanon. It does not take too much imagination to conclude that the crux of the disagreement between Adam and Halutz was over this issue, since Halutz was former head of the air force and Adam was head of the tanks corps. Most observers agree that Halutz relied too much on air power and should have involved the ground forces earlier and at larger strength than was eventually used, but others disagree. There was no doubt a great deal of indecision at the command level, with IDF forces being ordered into battle, and then the orders being either cancelled or changed. This has been interpreted as the higher echelon rescinding orders that might have resulted in casualties that would have been their responsibility. As a result the war was fought in an indecisive and incoherent manner.
The tactical failures were such as not supplying food and water to the troops on the ground, not taking enough precautions to protect troops in bivouac areas from incoming rockets, incorrect armaments, not enough intelligence of fortified Hizbollah positions, not enough coordination between helicopters and ground forces, etc. Other failures, included the lack of a defence against short range Katyusha rockets (Nautilus) and no active defence of tanks (17 were hit and several IDF servicemen were killed), even though systems to do this were recently cancelled by the Defense Ministry.
There are now several Committees set up by the Olmert Government to look into these failures and report. No doubt some heads will roll, but Adam will probably not be one of them. He took the dignified way out.
It should be pointed out that after most wars, both sides lick their wounds and try to find out what happened. The sense of failure, of not having done as well as one could have done, is probably inevitable. But, while Israel is facing its failures, it is sinking in in Lebanon and the Arab world that Hizbollah took a drubbing. They have been forced to agree to things that were inconceivable before the war, such as the deployment of the Lebanese Army and international forces (UNIFIL2) in the south and in view of the huge extent of the destruction in the Shia areas, they will not any time soon risk losing their support in Lebanon and among the Shia by provoking Israel or jeopardizing the ceasefire.
posted by Jack Cohen at 9:25 PM
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