The North Korean connection
The Israeli air-strike on Syria that occurred on Sept. 6 may have been a more significant event than initially realized. It must have been very important because no Israeli source has leaked information about it, and that is almost unprecedented.
Rumors published in reputable newspapers in the West speculate that North Korea was the source of nuclear materiel or facilities that were supplied to Syria and that were bombed by the IAF in a remote area of north-eastern Syria. Why would N. Korea give/sell such material to Syria? Mainly because according to its agreement with the group of 5 nations engaged in nuclear talks with N. Korea, including the US, N. Korea is now banned from continuing any nuclear weapons development program. Transferring their program and nuclear materiel to Syria may have been one way that N. Korea, or Kim Sung-Il, thought that they could out-maneuver or cheat this agreement.
There is no doubt that if large sums of money were involved for this they must have been paid by Iran not Syria that is practically broke. But, why not transfer the shipments directly to Iran rather than to Syria? For two reasons, first Iran is under constant surveillance by the IAEA over its own nuclear weapons program, and could not afford to be caught red-handed. Second, Syria is closer to Israel and might be considered to have a marginally better chance to succesfully launch missiles with nuclear tips at Israel. Note that the Scud missiles in the Syrian and Iranian arsenals are based on N. Korean originals.
It is reported that some 8 months ago the IDF detected the N. Korean activity in Syria, including the building of the facility in that remote region. Further analysis showed that nuclear material was being transferred to the site, and a large shipment labelled "cement" was shipped there only a few weeks ago. It was decided at the highest levels of the Israeli Govt. that this facility must be hit before it became operational and nuclear tipped missiles could be launched at Israel from Syria as a "surprise attack." According to reports only the top three members of the Israeli Govt. were kept informed of this development.
What was most interesting about this strike was that a few months ago Iran paid for and installed a top level radar-based air defense system in Syria, that was even better than that protecting the Iranian air space and nuclear facilities. No doubt Syria and Iran were confident that they could carry out these secret activities protected by this new air defense system. But, the IAF managed to not only penetrate this defense system, but also bombed the facility in that remote region without any interference. It is rumored that an IDF team of commandos was on the ground in Syria with laser targeting devices to make sure that Israeli bombs hit their targets. The quiet satisfaction apparently felt in Israel indicates that the attack was successful and achieved its objectives.
There are three results of this action. First, the obvious one, that the "surprise" being planned by Syria boomeranged back on them and the danger to Israel has been averted. Second, that the air defenses of Syria and Iran are no impediment to the IAF, and presumably to the USAF, if they decide to attack the nuclear facilities in Iran. The third result is the re-establishment of the important Israeli deterrent capability, that appeared to be tarnished after the Second Lebanon War.
One aspect of this action is the lack of crowing about its success by the Israelis, perhaps so as not to put pressure on the Syrians to mount a counter-attack. But, they know that if they try to do so, the IDF is ready!
Rumors published in reputable newspapers in the West speculate that North Korea was the source of nuclear materiel or facilities that were supplied to Syria and that were bombed by the IAF in a remote area of north-eastern Syria. Why would N. Korea give/sell such material to Syria? Mainly because according to its agreement with the group of 5 nations engaged in nuclear talks with N. Korea, including the US, N. Korea is now banned from continuing any nuclear weapons development program. Transferring their program and nuclear materiel to Syria may have been one way that N. Korea, or Kim Sung-Il, thought that they could out-maneuver or cheat this agreement.
There is no doubt that if large sums of money were involved for this they must have been paid by Iran not Syria that is practically broke. But, why not transfer the shipments directly to Iran rather than to Syria? For two reasons, first Iran is under constant surveillance by the IAEA over its own nuclear weapons program, and could not afford to be caught red-handed. Second, Syria is closer to Israel and might be considered to have a marginally better chance to succesfully launch missiles with nuclear tips at Israel. Note that the Scud missiles in the Syrian and Iranian arsenals are based on N. Korean originals.
It is reported that some 8 months ago the IDF detected the N. Korean activity in Syria, including the building of the facility in that remote region. Further analysis showed that nuclear material was being transferred to the site, and a large shipment labelled "cement" was shipped there only a few weeks ago. It was decided at the highest levels of the Israeli Govt. that this facility must be hit before it became operational and nuclear tipped missiles could be launched at Israel from Syria as a "surprise attack." According to reports only the top three members of the Israeli Govt. were kept informed of this development.
What was most interesting about this strike was that a few months ago Iran paid for and installed a top level radar-based air defense system in Syria, that was even better than that protecting the Iranian air space and nuclear facilities. No doubt Syria and Iran were confident that they could carry out these secret activities protected by this new air defense system. But, the IAF managed to not only penetrate this defense system, but also bombed the facility in that remote region without any interference. It is rumored that an IDF team of commandos was on the ground in Syria with laser targeting devices to make sure that Israeli bombs hit their targets. The quiet satisfaction apparently felt in Israel indicates that the attack was successful and achieved its objectives.
There are three results of this action. First, the obvious one, that the "surprise" being planned by Syria boomeranged back on them and the danger to Israel has been averted. Second, that the air defenses of Syria and Iran are no impediment to the IAF, and presumably to the USAF, if they decide to attack the nuclear facilities in Iran. The third result is the re-establishment of the important Israeli deterrent capability, that appeared to be tarnished after the Second Lebanon War.
One aspect of this action is the lack of crowing about its success by the Israelis, perhaps so as not to put pressure on the Syrians to mount a counter-attack. But, they know that if they try to do so, the IDF is ready!
posted by Jack Cohen at 9:07 AM
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