The next round?
Now that Kofi Annan has met with the EU FMs and France has reverted to its offer to send 2,000 men and Belgium and others have agreed to participate, then its looks like the new improved UNIFIL2 force will actually come into existence with ca. 7,000 EU-supplied men. There will also probably be Turkish and possibly other Muslim country participants.
There are several ways of looking at the force that is gradually taking shape in Lebanon. First, it could be regarded as simply a continuation of the old UNIFIL, watching what is happening, recording Hizbollah and Israeli breakages of the ceasefire, but doing nothing active. If so, this would hardly be the force called for in resolution 1701 that is supposed to disarm Hizbollah and prevent smuggling of arms. If it is to be a more robust force, more heavily armed as it is, then it should be expected to do something about Hizbollah fighters running around heavily armed in S. Lebanon. But, the rules of engagement do not require it to "disarm" Hizbollah, since the Lebanese Government has not asked them to do that. So why are they there?
There could be two answers to that question. First, they could be there to police the ceasefire between Hizbollah and the IDF. But, in effect by not acting against Hizbollah they cannot fulfil that basic task. Another answer could be that they are there to safeguard Lebanese sovereignty, security and democracy.
It has been stated time and time again that if the requirements of UN resolution 1559 had been implemented after it was adopted in 2000 when Israel withdrew, then there would not have been a further war in Lebanon in 2006. But, it was not implemented then, so how can we expect it to be implemented now, especially since the Lebanese Government is either sincere in supporting the right of Hizbollah to "resist" the IDF or is simply afraid to oppose it. Given the latter most likely possibility, the presence of a robust international force, with the Lebanese Army deployed in the south for the first time, could make a difference in Hizbollah's control over S. Lebanon. But, S. Lebanon is the Shia homeland, and it is unlikely that anything that "foreign" troops could do there would affect the local population's strong support for Hizbollah.
Also, in terms of trying to prevent smuggling of arms to Hizbollah, the international force can probably do little. It is easy to get small arms and even small rockets over the long border from Syria undetected, and over a period of time it is certain that Hizbollah will be rearmed. So contrary to Pres. Bush's and other's wishes, we will be back to where we started in a short while, months to years, and the presence of the international force may only complicate the nature of the next war between Israel and Hizbollah. There will be even more possibilities of "collateral damage" to UN forces and civilian casualties. The trap for Israel is already being set in place.
One way that Israel could avoid the trap of being bled again in Lebanon, would be to go for the jugular, to counter-attack the countries that are in fact arming and financing Hizbollah and using it as proxy to fight Israel, namely Syria and Iran. This would be a highly risky and dangerous business, but what are the alternatives, to be periodically bled and bombarded by Hizbollah. In every decade Israel has had to fight major wars against numerically far larger and well armed foes. How miraculous that we have not only survived but won each time until now. Fighting Hizbollah is perhaps even more problematical than fighting Syria for the IDF, especially with complete air superiority. But, if we counter-attack Syria, will it incite Iran, can we afford to wait for Iran to unleash missiles on us? Can we afford to wait until Iran has nuclear warheads?
There are several ways of looking at the force that is gradually taking shape in Lebanon. First, it could be regarded as simply a continuation of the old UNIFIL, watching what is happening, recording Hizbollah and Israeli breakages of the ceasefire, but doing nothing active. If so, this would hardly be the force called for in resolution 1701 that is supposed to disarm Hizbollah and prevent smuggling of arms. If it is to be a more robust force, more heavily armed as it is, then it should be expected to do something about Hizbollah fighters running around heavily armed in S. Lebanon. But, the rules of engagement do not require it to "disarm" Hizbollah, since the Lebanese Government has not asked them to do that. So why are they there?
There could be two answers to that question. First, they could be there to police the ceasefire between Hizbollah and the IDF. But, in effect by not acting against Hizbollah they cannot fulfil that basic task. Another answer could be that they are there to safeguard Lebanese sovereignty, security and democracy.
It has been stated time and time again that if the requirements of UN resolution 1559 had been implemented after it was adopted in 2000 when Israel withdrew, then there would not have been a further war in Lebanon in 2006. But, it was not implemented then, so how can we expect it to be implemented now, especially since the Lebanese Government is either sincere in supporting the right of Hizbollah to "resist" the IDF or is simply afraid to oppose it. Given the latter most likely possibility, the presence of a robust international force, with the Lebanese Army deployed in the south for the first time, could make a difference in Hizbollah's control over S. Lebanon. But, S. Lebanon is the Shia homeland, and it is unlikely that anything that "foreign" troops could do there would affect the local population's strong support for Hizbollah.
Also, in terms of trying to prevent smuggling of arms to Hizbollah, the international force can probably do little. It is easy to get small arms and even small rockets over the long border from Syria undetected, and over a period of time it is certain that Hizbollah will be rearmed. So contrary to Pres. Bush's and other's wishes, we will be back to where we started in a short while, months to years, and the presence of the international force may only complicate the nature of the next war between Israel and Hizbollah. There will be even more possibilities of "collateral damage" to UN forces and civilian casualties. The trap for Israel is already being set in place.
One way that Israel could avoid the trap of being bled again in Lebanon, would be to go for the jugular, to counter-attack the countries that are in fact arming and financing Hizbollah and using it as proxy to fight Israel, namely Syria and Iran. This would be a highly risky and dangerous business, but what are the alternatives, to be periodically bled and bombarded by Hizbollah. In every decade Israel has had to fight major wars against numerically far larger and well armed foes. How miraculous that we have not only survived but won each time until now. Fighting Hizbollah is perhaps even more problematical than fighting Syria for the IDF, especially with complete air superiority. But, if we counter-attack Syria, will it incite Iran, can we afford to wait for Iran to unleash missiles on us? Can we afford to wait until Iran has nuclear warheads?
posted by Jack Cohen at 6:17 PM
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