UNSC1701
UNSC1701 that was passed unanimously on Friday by the UN Security Council is a partial victory for Israel and the US. Undoubtedly compromises had to be made that are less than perfect from an Israeli perspective in order to achieve the unanimous consensus. But, a lot was accomplished that had never been achieved by Israel before.
• In the preamble it is made clear that Hizbollah is the cause of the current conflict.
• One of the clauses calls for the “unconditional return” of the captured Israeli soldiers. But, being in the introduction this does not have the force of an operational paragraph and no mechanism is suggested as to how this could be accomplished.
• The main success is that the resolution calls for the formation of a military force of 15,000 men to implement the resolution in relation to removing armed Hizbollah forces from south Lebanon below the Litani River, as required by UNSC1559, but never implemented. However, this will be a reconstituted UNIFIL contingent, not what Israel wanted, although its mandate will be much tougher, and this will be spelled out in a further resolution.
• Another success is that while Hizbollah is told to cease “all attacks” Israel is required to cease “all offensive actions,” leaving the door open for any defensive actions that the IDF may need to take if attacks by Hizbollah forces continue.
• The main problem with this resolution is that it does not contain any mechanism to force Hizbollah to accept its provisions. Although Sheikh Nasrullah said that he would accept the resolution, he also contradicted this when he said that Hizbollah will continue to fight if Israeli forces remain in Lebanon. This might be finessed by his accepting a time-table once the international force is constituted.
• One of the main problems with the resolution is that no mechanism is proposed for how the international force, and presumably the Lebanese Army, would replace the IDF that is only now consolidating its hold over south Lebanon. This presumably would be spelled out in a second resolution that is planned.
• The Lebanese Government officially accepted the resolution on Saturday after a long Cabinet session, and declared it a victory for Lebanese diplomacy. They did indeed achieve some things, such as the requirement for the IDF to be withdrawn from Lebanon, but not “immediately” as they wanted. But, they failed in their attempt to get the SC to force Israel to withdraw from the Shebaa Farms area, since the UN had previously assigned that to Syria, and so it is only mentioned in the Resolution as something that Kofi Annan must consider and report back to the SC.
• Israel’s cabinet is due to meet today (Sunday) and is expected to accept the resolution, with a ceasefire to be implemented early Monday, apart from any defensive actions necessary, for example if Hizbollah continues to fire rockets into Israel and continues to fight IDF forces in south Lebanon. Of course, the definition of a ceasefire under these circumstances is quite murky.
• There is now criticism for the first time during the war of the Olmert Government from the left and the right in Israel. The left see the “invasion” of Lebanon and the high level of Lebanese civilian casualties reported (although not confirmed) as unacceptable. The right see the delay of the IDF’s general invasion of the south as a huge error (they would have preferred it a month ago), and do not want the Government to accept the resolution until Hizbollah is definitively degraded
• “Softening up” of Hizbollah by the IAF was a necessary prerequisite before ground action, but was overextended, and the ground forces should have bypassed the fortified villages, according to Yuval Steinitz, former head of the Knesset Defense Committee, “We should have used ground forces four weeks ago, pushed through north of Hizbollah, surprised them and given them no chance to withdraw northward.” Frontal attacks on fortified Hizbollah villages was not a usual tactic for the IDF, and undoubtedly caused higher casualties. There seemed in this war to be an excess of caution and a loss of élan and deterrence by the IDF.
• Can the war be termed a victory for either Hizbullah or Israel? Undoubtedly Hizbollah will claim a victory, because they always do. Having fought a determined defensive action and having caused significant Israeli casualties and having brought down an IAF helicopter, all of these will be labeled “victories” by the Arab street. Note that this has been the longest war in Israeli history, refuting the claim by some that Israel could not survive a long war. Also, the home front, under severe attack with many casualties in the north and extensive destruction, and Israel’s third city Haifa essentially paralyzed, nevertheless came through this war with great resilience.
• Nevertheless the IDF could not “destroy” Hizbollah, as some enthusiastic commentators wished at the beginning, and it will undoubtedly remain intact, either as a purely political force in Lebanon or more likely as an armed force but north of the Litani River, from whence it could recommence its rocket attacks on Israel when it chooses. Although the UN resolution calls for an embargo on arms shipments and imports to any armed group except the Lebanese Government, this is unlikely to be enforceable, and Syria and Iran are no doubt already planning how to circumvent this condition.
Overall, while the fighting still continues, this has been a costly and difficult war for Israel, one of the first in which Israel’s homeland was under direct attack, and in which, as well as military casualties, there were also extensive civilian casualties. Although the war in Lebanon (not with Lebanon) has completely overshadowed the war in Gaza with Hamas, they will consider it a successful formula, namely bombarding Israel with numerous and long-range rockets (so far they only have short range Kassams). Israel cannot afford to sit idly by while Hizbullah prepares for the next round, and this UN resolution for all its pretensions will not likely prevent that happening.
Another effect of the war will be on the Israeli domestic political scene, I doubt that Olmert will try to pursue his flagship policy of “unilateral withdrawal” from the West Bank, putting the heart of Israel within rocket range. In both places where Israel withdrew, Lebanon and Gaza, we had worse attacks than before, as the opponents of unilateral withdrawal predicted. For Olmert to continue to pursue this policy now would be political suicide.
• In the preamble it is made clear that Hizbollah is the cause of the current conflict.
• One of the clauses calls for the “unconditional return” of the captured Israeli soldiers. But, being in the introduction this does not have the force of an operational paragraph and no mechanism is suggested as to how this could be accomplished.
• The main success is that the resolution calls for the formation of a military force of 15,000 men to implement the resolution in relation to removing armed Hizbollah forces from south Lebanon below the Litani River, as required by UNSC1559, but never implemented. However, this will be a reconstituted UNIFIL contingent, not what Israel wanted, although its mandate will be much tougher, and this will be spelled out in a further resolution.
• Another success is that while Hizbollah is told to cease “all attacks” Israel is required to cease “all offensive actions,” leaving the door open for any defensive actions that the IDF may need to take if attacks by Hizbollah forces continue.
• The main problem with this resolution is that it does not contain any mechanism to force Hizbollah to accept its provisions. Although Sheikh Nasrullah said that he would accept the resolution, he also contradicted this when he said that Hizbollah will continue to fight if Israeli forces remain in Lebanon. This might be finessed by his accepting a time-table once the international force is constituted.
• One of the main problems with the resolution is that no mechanism is proposed for how the international force, and presumably the Lebanese Army, would replace the IDF that is only now consolidating its hold over south Lebanon. This presumably would be spelled out in a second resolution that is planned.
• The Lebanese Government officially accepted the resolution on Saturday after a long Cabinet session, and declared it a victory for Lebanese diplomacy. They did indeed achieve some things, such as the requirement for the IDF to be withdrawn from Lebanon, but not “immediately” as they wanted. But, they failed in their attempt to get the SC to force Israel to withdraw from the Shebaa Farms area, since the UN had previously assigned that to Syria, and so it is only mentioned in the Resolution as something that Kofi Annan must consider and report back to the SC.
• Israel’s cabinet is due to meet today (Sunday) and is expected to accept the resolution, with a ceasefire to be implemented early Monday, apart from any defensive actions necessary, for example if Hizbollah continues to fire rockets into Israel and continues to fight IDF forces in south Lebanon. Of course, the definition of a ceasefire under these circumstances is quite murky.
• There is now criticism for the first time during the war of the Olmert Government from the left and the right in Israel. The left see the “invasion” of Lebanon and the high level of Lebanese civilian casualties reported (although not confirmed) as unacceptable. The right see the delay of the IDF’s general invasion of the south as a huge error (they would have preferred it a month ago), and do not want the Government to accept the resolution until Hizbollah is definitively degraded
• “Softening up” of Hizbollah by the IAF was a necessary prerequisite before ground action, but was overextended, and the ground forces should have bypassed the fortified villages, according to Yuval Steinitz, former head of the Knesset Defense Committee, “We should have used ground forces four weeks ago, pushed through north of Hizbollah, surprised them and given them no chance to withdraw northward.” Frontal attacks on fortified Hizbollah villages was not a usual tactic for the IDF, and undoubtedly caused higher casualties. There seemed in this war to be an excess of caution and a loss of élan and deterrence by the IDF.
• Can the war be termed a victory for either Hizbullah or Israel? Undoubtedly Hizbollah will claim a victory, because they always do. Having fought a determined defensive action and having caused significant Israeli casualties and having brought down an IAF helicopter, all of these will be labeled “victories” by the Arab street. Note that this has been the longest war in Israeli history, refuting the claim by some that Israel could not survive a long war. Also, the home front, under severe attack with many casualties in the north and extensive destruction, and Israel’s third city Haifa essentially paralyzed, nevertheless came through this war with great resilience.
• Nevertheless the IDF could not “destroy” Hizbollah, as some enthusiastic commentators wished at the beginning, and it will undoubtedly remain intact, either as a purely political force in Lebanon or more likely as an armed force but north of the Litani River, from whence it could recommence its rocket attacks on Israel when it chooses. Although the UN resolution calls for an embargo on arms shipments and imports to any armed group except the Lebanese Government, this is unlikely to be enforceable, and Syria and Iran are no doubt already planning how to circumvent this condition.
Overall, while the fighting still continues, this has been a costly and difficult war for Israel, one of the first in which Israel’s homeland was under direct attack, and in which, as well as military casualties, there were also extensive civilian casualties. Although the war in Lebanon (not with Lebanon) has completely overshadowed the war in Gaza with Hamas, they will consider it a successful formula, namely bombarding Israel with numerous and long-range rockets (so far they only have short range Kassams). Israel cannot afford to sit idly by while Hizbullah prepares for the next round, and this UN resolution for all its pretensions will not likely prevent that happening.
Another effect of the war will be on the Israeli domestic political scene, I doubt that Olmert will try to pursue his flagship policy of “unilateral withdrawal” from the West Bank, putting the heart of Israel within rocket range. In both places where Israel withdrew, Lebanon and Gaza, we had worse attacks than before, as the opponents of unilateral withdrawal predicted. For Olmert to continue to pursue this policy now would be political suicide.
posted by Jack Cohen at 11:37 AM
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