Sunday, January 23, 2005

Hudna?

A tentative ceasefire (or hudna) is currently operating in the Gaza Strip,
without any actual agreement between the PA and Israel. Although the
terrorist groups, al Aksa, PFLP, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, have all issued
separate statements, most of them demanding pre-conditions from Israel, the
Israeli Govt. has pointed out that it is not negotiating with them. And
even with the PA there have been no direct diplomatic contacts, since the
writing is on the wall. Sharon has made it clear to Abbas that either he
can engineer a ceasefire and hold back the terrorists or the IDF will be
given the go-ahead to invade northern Gaza. At present no rockets are being
fired at Sderot and no attacks have taken place for 4 days. This is a minor
victory of sorts, but it is highly tentative at present.
To show their solidarity with the inhabitants of Sderot the Israeli cabinet
met there today. This follows the death of Ayala Abukasis (17) who died
after shielding her younger brother from a rocket last week. Many of the
Ministers were upbeat about the ceasefire, including Shaul Mofaz (Defense)
and Shimon Peres. But, there are still conflicting reports since there are
at least three levels of each of the terrorist organizations, the local
level, the command level in Gaza and the HQ, usually in Damascus. It seems
that at the local level there are different factions that have issued
different responses from each other, but the main relevant response is the
Command level. However, the HQs in Damascus are saying that they have not
yet agreed to any ceasefire.
It seems that Abbas is most concerned to get the ceasefire on the ground,
and so has deployed 3-4,000 armed troops around the border regions in
northern (Beit Hanun) and southern (Khan Yunis) Gaza to prevent attacks by
the irregular forces. The fact that he was able to do this quite easily
shows how irresponsible the previous regime of Yasser Arafat was in not even
attempting to prevent terrorist attacks. Now the terrorists have a choice,
either continue with their attacks and risk a clash with the PA security
forces, or toe the line.
There are at least three reasons why they are prepared for a hudna now: 1.
The general malaise of the Palestinian population. This is perhaps the most
important and least recognized factor. The Palestinian population is
suffering from casualties, destruction of their homes and infrastructure,
and lack of work and money. In fact, if one compares the two sides one can
state emphatically that the IDF has won the war of the second intifada. In
many cases Palestinians have died from terrorist bombs going off prematurely
in densely populated areas, or have even been hit by rockets and mortars
that have gone off course. Also, there is a pervasive lawlessness, men are
still being abducted and murdered by gangs in the street with the excuse
that they are "collaborators." This happened in Nablus again last week
(while 5 others were arrested and jailed by the PA security forces for their
'protection'). All of these losses have demoralized the Palestinian
population and so there is a publicly unstated underswell (popular opinion)
to change the situation and stop the attacks in order to relieve the
population of its stress. The advent of Abbas is the reflection of this
transformation.
2. The terrorist groups have lost hundreds of their leaders, and thousands
of their men either killed or captured. And they have not been able to
deliver any tangible results to their constituency. Under the circumstances
they are better off to leave the field for a time, in order to regroup
and/or change their strategy.
3. Seeing the advent of Abbas, and sensing the change of the Palestinian
population's attitude, Hamas and the others are considering accepting Abbas'
offer for them to join in the new political process rather than concentrate
mostly on the 'military' solution. Abbas has said to them in effect, "yes,
maybe you do have the right to wage the 'armed struggle', but what good does
it do you if you are both losing militarily and losing the public's
support."
This is why they need say a month to decide which way to go, since it would
be a change in strategy not only for the PA, but also for the resistance
groups that until now have essentially operated independently of it. There
are supposed to be further talks in Cairo soon between Abbas and Hamas.
Some commentators are saying that now is the time for Israel to act to
"empower" Abbas, to make concessions to him so that he can show the
terrorist groups that Israel is really ready to reciprocate. But, this is
precisely the mistake that Israel made under the Oslo accords, taking every
opportunity to empower Arafat, while he was using that power to support the
terrorists in their attacks. It would be a mistake to prematurely start to
make concessions to Abbas until actual negotiations take place. If Israel
makes commitments to Abbas on behalf of the terrorists that is a kind of
acknowledgement of their "victory." On the contrary, let him negotiate
within an internal Palestinian context, as it should be, and then come to
Israel and indicate what he wants. Only then can Israel evaluate the
circumstances and what actions it is prepared to take.
One thing that Abbas clearly wants is to be able to take over any areas of
Gaza that the IDF withdraws from in a coordinated bilateral way, rather than
have Israel withdraw unilaterally and leave areas 'up for grabs.' You can
be sure that Abbas is prepared to do a lot to prevent another IDF attack
into Gaza, ensuring another terrible defeat while it is under his command
and also to avoid squandering the possibility of coordinating with Israel
when the disengagement plan goes ahead. These issues reflect positive
possibilities in the future.


0 Comments:

Post a Comment

<< Home