The lessons of 5766
The past year, 5766 in the Hebrew calendar, has been a momentous year in Jewish/Israeli history. Not only was there the second Lebanese war with Hizbollah, but all the events leading up to it. The disengagement from Gaza, that lead to PM Sharon losing support among his own Likud Party, hence the splitting off to form the Kadima Party. Then Sharon's strokes that finally put him out of the picture, although he is still alive.
Then Olmert stepped forward as Sharon's successor and became PM. The election resulting in Kadima's victory on the basis of the "realignment" from the West Bank, and then the formation of a coalition with Labor, resulting in Amir Peretz, for the first time a man with no relevant background, becoming Defense Minister. The firing of Kassem rockets from Gaza, finally reaching Ashkelon, resulted in IDF action to try to stop the rockets, and then the Hamas attack that resulted in the killing of two IDF soldiers and the capture of Cpl. Shalit. Then Hizbollah decided to get into the act, and carried out a similar action on the northern front, crossing the international border killing 8 IDF soldiers and capturing two, Goldwasser and Regev. We all know these bare facts, but what about the trends behind them, what do they portend?
Perhaps the most significant outcome was that the IDF was unable to "win" this war. They were unable to achieve any of the main goals of the war, first the recapture of the two Lebanese captives, second the "destruction" of Hizbollah, and third stopping the Katyusha bombardment on northern Israel. Yes, the IAF did extensively destroy Hizbollah assets in south Beirut and southern Lebanon. But, the fact is that Hizbollah was still fighting up to the ceasefire and after a month was still firing 100 rockets a day into Israel. By all accounts the actions of the IDF were uninspiring. Examples are: 1. The lack of readiness of the IDF for action in the north. It is an amazing fact that knowing that Hizbollah had over 10,000 rockets and knowing that they had been fortifying the villages in southern Lebanon for 6 years, there were no up-to-date maps or intelligence available for an IDF invading force. One would think this was elementary, how could they send men into action with maps dating from 2000? Unbelievable! 2. The political and military echelons were unprepared for any kind of war, and had no overall strategy. Decisions about how to execute the war were made on the spur of the moment with no overall plan of action. It was obvious to most people that an invasion of the north was necessary in order to try to stop the firing of the rockets, but this was repeatedly put off in favor of air attacks and piecemeal attacks on fortified villages, until two days before the ceasefire. In the past, Israel's tactics have always been to bypass heavily fortified positions and cut off the lines of supply in the rear. Why was this not attempted in this situation? 3. Hizbollah was not a bunch of ill-trained terrorists as we thought, but a well-trained and well-equipped terrorist army. Their tactics were well-prepared, they used motor bikes to outflank IDF positions, they listened in to IDF communciations and due to carelessness by Israeli reservists they were able to decode and decipher front line conversations.
Yesterday Hizbollah held a huge victory rally in south Beirut. Sheikh Nasrallah harangued the crowd and declared a "holy" victory. For the first time an Arab force (supported by the Iranians) had "defeated" the glorified IDF. In reality things are not so clear-cut. By objective measures, the destruction of its infrastructure and the loss of its fighters, Hizbullah really lost. But, in terms of PR and politics they won. So the results on both sides of the border are characteristically different. Hizbollah celebrates a victory, while the Israeli people are soul-searching, why were 100 IDF and 50 civilians killed, why did the home front fail to act (people in the north were left to their own devices), and why did the IDF not achieve its principal aims? All of these questions will be considered in great detail in the coming year, and let's hope answers will be forthcoming, so that such as situation will never be allowed to be repeated.
One thing is clear, we have to throw out the current Government, we have to repudiate the policy, that we tried and saw that it failed, of piecemeal "disengagements," and continue to retain as much territory as possible until any kind of reciprocal agreement can be negotiated with the PA. We have to replace the Government with more experienced and militarily competent men, particularly in the key positions of Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff (no more Air Force Chiefs). I don't believe it is appropriate to call for their immediate resignations, the results of the war were not that drastic, and it is best not to "change horses in mid-stream." The Committees need to report back, the true picture needs to be examined in detail, and then maybe the coalition will collapse and a new election will be held.
It is not hard to predict that Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud will be elected PM with a larger majority and that Kadima will be thrashed. As usual a center party lasts for only one term in Israeli politics, and as a result of the war a majority of Israelis have turned to the right, under the circumstances this is the only sensible thing to do. In a recent poll of potential candidates, Netanyahu scored 45%, Olmert 24% and Peretz, Head of the Labor Party 1%! When the current Government releases 500-1,000 prisoners for captive soldiers that were kidnapped as a result of its incompetent policies then the die will be cast.
May 5767 be a better and more peaceful year for Israel, and may the lessons of the past year be learnt.
Then Olmert stepped forward as Sharon's successor and became PM. The election resulting in Kadima's victory on the basis of the "realignment" from the West Bank, and then the formation of a coalition with Labor, resulting in Amir Peretz, for the first time a man with no relevant background, becoming Defense Minister. The firing of Kassem rockets from Gaza, finally reaching Ashkelon, resulted in IDF action to try to stop the rockets, and then the Hamas attack that resulted in the killing of two IDF soldiers and the capture of Cpl. Shalit. Then Hizbollah decided to get into the act, and carried out a similar action on the northern front, crossing the international border killing 8 IDF soldiers and capturing two, Goldwasser and Regev. We all know these bare facts, but what about the trends behind them, what do they portend?
Perhaps the most significant outcome was that the IDF was unable to "win" this war. They were unable to achieve any of the main goals of the war, first the recapture of the two Lebanese captives, second the "destruction" of Hizbollah, and third stopping the Katyusha bombardment on northern Israel. Yes, the IAF did extensively destroy Hizbollah assets in south Beirut and southern Lebanon. But, the fact is that Hizbollah was still fighting up to the ceasefire and after a month was still firing 100 rockets a day into Israel. By all accounts the actions of the IDF were uninspiring. Examples are: 1. The lack of readiness of the IDF for action in the north. It is an amazing fact that knowing that Hizbollah had over 10,000 rockets and knowing that they had been fortifying the villages in southern Lebanon for 6 years, there were no up-to-date maps or intelligence available for an IDF invading force. One would think this was elementary, how could they send men into action with maps dating from 2000? Unbelievable! 2. The political and military echelons were unprepared for any kind of war, and had no overall strategy. Decisions about how to execute the war were made on the spur of the moment with no overall plan of action. It was obvious to most people that an invasion of the north was necessary in order to try to stop the firing of the rockets, but this was repeatedly put off in favor of air attacks and piecemeal attacks on fortified villages, until two days before the ceasefire. In the past, Israel's tactics have always been to bypass heavily fortified positions and cut off the lines of supply in the rear. Why was this not attempted in this situation? 3. Hizbollah was not a bunch of ill-trained terrorists as we thought, but a well-trained and well-equipped terrorist army. Their tactics were well-prepared, they used motor bikes to outflank IDF positions, they listened in to IDF communciations and due to carelessness by Israeli reservists they were able to decode and decipher front line conversations.
Yesterday Hizbollah held a huge victory rally in south Beirut. Sheikh Nasrallah harangued the crowd and declared a "holy" victory. For the first time an Arab force (supported by the Iranians) had "defeated" the glorified IDF. In reality things are not so clear-cut. By objective measures, the destruction of its infrastructure and the loss of its fighters, Hizbullah really lost. But, in terms of PR and politics they won. So the results on both sides of the border are characteristically different. Hizbollah celebrates a victory, while the Israeli people are soul-searching, why were 100 IDF and 50 civilians killed, why did the home front fail to act (people in the north were left to their own devices), and why did the IDF not achieve its principal aims? All of these questions will be considered in great detail in the coming year, and let's hope answers will be forthcoming, so that such as situation will never be allowed to be repeated.
One thing is clear, we have to throw out the current Government, we have to repudiate the policy, that we tried and saw that it failed, of piecemeal "disengagements," and continue to retain as much territory as possible until any kind of reciprocal agreement can be negotiated with the PA. We have to replace the Government with more experienced and militarily competent men, particularly in the key positions of Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff (no more Air Force Chiefs). I don't believe it is appropriate to call for their immediate resignations, the results of the war were not that drastic, and it is best not to "change horses in mid-stream." The Committees need to report back, the true picture needs to be examined in detail, and then maybe the coalition will collapse and a new election will be held.
It is not hard to predict that Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud will be elected PM with a larger majority and that Kadima will be thrashed. As usual a center party lasts for only one term in Israeli politics, and as a result of the war a majority of Israelis have turned to the right, under the circumstances this is the only sensible thing to do. In a recent poll of potential candidates, Netanyahu scored 45%, Olmert 24% and Peretz, Head of the Labor Party 1%! When the current Government releases 500-1,000 prisoners for captive soldiers that were kidnapped as a result of its incompetent policies then the die will be cast.
May 5767 be a better and more peaceful year for Israel, and may the lessons of the past year be learnt.
posted by Jack Cohen at 2:11 PM
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