Israeli arrogance
There have been numerous incidents that indicate an arrogance of Israeli military preparations, an assumption that the enemy is incapable of carrying out effective operations, an assumption that all will work out for the best. David Horovitz, Editor of The Jerusalem Post, in a column entitled "Underestimating our enemies" (http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=184614) ascribes this to Israeli "hubris," an alternative synonym.
Perhaps the worst example of this phenomenon was the absolute refusal of the Chief of Military Intelligence, Gen. Eli Zeira in 1973 to believe that the Egyptian forces could cross the Suez Canal and attack the IDF fortifications there, even when the evidence was staring him in the face. Only on the same morning that the Egyptians turned a supposed training operation into an actual attack on the IDF positions with a superiority of 40:1 did the Intelligence chief acknowledge that they might be attacking, when they actually were. The result of this arrogance was the loss of ca 3,000 Israeli lives due to complete lack of readiness, when all but one of the forts along the Canal were over-run. Of course, this attitude was bred from the overwhelming success of the IAF and IDF in the Six Day War of 1967. So the Chief of Intelligence believed his own propaganda, that the Egyptians were incapable of fighting and so he was still fighting the 1967 war. But, Sadat was cleverer than he, and totally outwitted the IDF. It was only Sadat's mistake to follow up his initial success by sending his tanks out from under the protection of the umbrella of Scud missiles along the Canal, at the insistence of the Syrians who were being defeated, that allowed the IAF to destroy his tank formations and turn the tide of war.
A few other examples: 1. In 1997 a team of elite Israeli naval commandos from the Shayetet 13 inflitrated Lebanon to attack a terrorist center. They had excellent intelligence from a drone that had flown over the region. But, unknown to them Hizbollah had intercepted the signals from the drone that had been sent in the clear, unencrypted. So the terrorists knew the naval forces route and simply waited for them and ambushed them, 12 out of 16 commandos were killed. The IDF knew how to encryt these images, but didn't bother to do so, because they assumed that Hizbollah were too stupid to intercept even a straightforward transmission. Sheikh Nasrullah, Head of Hizbollah, referred to this unsuccessful attack in his speech in Lebanon and claimed incredibly that it was a prelude to the assassination of Rafik Hariri. 2. In the 1982 Lebanon War, IDF tanks ran straight ahead along the coast. At a certain point where the road narrowed, instead of waiting for reconaissance, the tanks forged ahead and were ambushed by the Syrian Army and most of them were destroyed. Only a few IDF soldiers survived by swimming out to sea and coming back further south. This was an operational mistake that cost several tanks and many lives. 3. In the 2006 Second Lebanon War, the IDF infantry were sent in to villages north of the Lebanese border. Since there was heavy fire from entrenched Hizbollah positions, the soldiers took refuge behind the few houses on the edge of the village, and went inside them during the night for protection. But, Hizbollah had mined and pre-targeted those houses and they were mostly blown up, killing the IDF occupants. How is it that the IDF had not managed to realize that Hizbollah in all the years that they had occupied those villages had not prepared for such an eventuality. 4. During the Lebanon War a sophisticated Israeli Navy ship was standing off the Lebanese coast when a missile was fired at it from the shore, causing enormous damage and killing four sailors. The arrogance was that the vessel had anti-missile defences, but they were turned off because they thought that the enemy could not fire such advanced missiles. 5. In 2006, when IDF forces were surrounding Gaza much as they do now, the IDF had been warned that Hamas had been digging tunnels to undermine IDF positions. Even though the IDF had sensitive equipment to detect such digging operations they refused to use it. As a result an IDF position was attacked from the rear by a Hamas force that infiltrated from a tunnel and two soldiers were killed and Gilad Schalit was captured. He remains in captivity 4 years later. 6. In May, 2010, a group of 15 Shayetet 13 naval commandos rappelled onto the deck of the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara assuming that there would be no resistance. They carried paint-ball guns and luckily they also had real pistols. They were attacked by about 50 armed men with iron bars, knives and guns. The first IDF soldier who landed was thrown overboard, the second was shot. How is it that such an attack was allowed to go ahead assuming that there would be no resistance and no weapons on board? Wasn't this unnecessarily risking the lives of the commandos. The IDF Chief Gen. Ashkenazi admitted that the IDF should have "sterilized" the deck before attacking.
I could go on, but the point is clear; however good the IDF is, too often its decisions are flawed because of arrogance in underestimating the enemy. Will they learn these lessons and avoid these unnecessary risks in order not to sacrifice their soldiers, our family, in the future.
Perhaps the worst example of this phenomenon was the absolute refusal of the Chief of Military Intelligence, Gen. Eli Zeira in 1973 to believe that the Egyptian forces could cross the Suez Canal and attack the IDF fortifications there, even when the evidence was staring him in the face. Only on the same morning that the Egyptians turned a supposed training operation into an actual attack on the IDF positions with a superiority of 40:1 did the Intelligence chief acknowledge that they might be attacking, when they actually were. The result of this arrogance was the loss of ca 3,000 Israeli lives due to complete lack of readiness, when all but one of the forts along the Canal were over-run. Of course, this attitude was bred from the overwhelming success of the IAF and IDF in the Six Day War of 1967. So the Chief of Intelligence believed his own propaganda, that the Egyptians were incapable of fighting and so he was still fighting the 1967 war. But, Sadat was cleverer than he, and totally outwitted the IDF. It was only Sadat's mistake to follow up his initial success by sending his tanks out from under the protection of the umbrella of Scud missiles along the Canal, at the insistence of the Syrians who were being defeated, that allowed the IAF to destroy his tank formations and turn the tide of war.
A few other examples: 1. In 1997 a team of elite Israeli naval commandos from the Shayetet 13 inflitrated Lebanon to attack a terrorist center. They had excellent intelligence from a drone that had flown over the region. But, unknown to them Hizbollah had intercepted the signals from the drone that had been sent in the clear, unencrypted. So the terrorists knew the naval forces route and simply waited for them and ambushed them, 12 out of 16 commandos were killed. The IDF knew how to encryt these images, but didn't bother to do so, because they assumed that Hizbollah were too stupid to intercept even a straightforward transmission. Sheikh Nasrullah, Head of Hizbollah, referred to this unsuccessful attack in his speech in Lebanon and claimed incredibly that it was a prelude to the assassination of Rafik Hariri. 2. In the 1982 Lebanon War, IDF tanks ran straight ahead along the coast. At a certain point where the road narrowed, instead of waiting for reconaissance, the tanks forged ahead and were ambushed by the Syrian Army and most of them were destroyed. Only a few IDF soldiers survived by swimming out to sea and coming back further south. This was an operational mistake that cost several tanks and many lives. 3. In the 2006 Second Lebanon War, the IDF infantry were sent in to villages north of the Lebanese border. Since there was heavy fire from entrenched Hizbollah positions, the soldiers took refuge behind the few houses on the edge of the village, and went inside them during the night for protection. But, Hizbollah had mined and pre-targeted those houses and they were mostly blown up, killing the IDF occupants. How is it that the IDF had not managed to realize that Hizbollah in all the years that they had occupied those villages had not prepared for such an eventuality. 4. During the Lebanon War a sophisticated Israeli Navy ship was standing off the Lebanese coast when a missile was fired at it from the shore, causing enormous damage and killing four sailors. The arrogance was that the vessel had anti-missile defences, but they were turned off because they thought that the enemy could not fire such advanced missiles. 5. In 2006, when IDF forces were surrounding Gaza much as they do now, the IDF had been warned that Hamas had been digging tunnels to undermine IDF positions. Even though the IDF had sensitive equipment to detect such digging operations they refused to use it. As a result an IDF position was attacked from the rear by a Hamas force that infiltrated from a tunnel and two soldiers were killed and Gilad Schalit was captured. He remains in captivity 4 years later. 6. In May, 2010, a group of 15 Shayetet 13 naval commandos rappelled onto the deck of the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara assuming that there would be no resistance. They carried paint-ball guns and luckily they also had real pistols. They were attacked by about 50 armed men with iron bars, knives and guns. The first IDF soldier who landed was thrown overboard, the second was shot. How is it that such an attack was allowed to go ahead assuming that there would be no resistance and no weapons on board? Wasn't this unnecessarily risking the lives of the commandos. The IDF Chief Gen. Ashkenazi admitted that the IDF should have "sterilized" the deck before attacking.
I could go on, but the point is clear; however good the IDF is, too often its decisions are flawed because of arrogance in underestimating the enemy. Will they learn these lessons and avoid these unnecessary risks in order not to sacrifice their soldiers, our family, in the future.
posted by Jack Cohen at 7:37 AM
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